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JUDICIALLY CREATED LIFE AFTER DEATH:
RECOVERY BY A DECEDENT'S ESTATE FOR LOSS OF
LIFE UNDER 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983
William B. Mackin *
The Seventh Circuit has assumed the forefront in a recent trend allowing
a decedent to recover damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983' through his
estate for "loss of the right to life." ' 2 Under this theory, a decedent's estate
may seek to recover damages for the "hedonic value" of the decedent's
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their helpful comments and criticisms of earlier drafts. The author also thanks Helen Rane for
her typing assistance.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983, originally enacted as § I of the Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871, provides in relevant part as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, custom, or usage, of any
State ... subjects, causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ...to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
Under section 1983, a plaintiff must prove that (1) a person <2) acting under color of law
(3) subjected the plaintiff or caused the plaintiff to be subjected (4) to the deprivation of a
right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle,
471 U.S. 808, 825 (Brennan, J., concurring), reh'g denied, 473 U.S. 925 (1985).
Because there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983, municipal liability will
lie only if a plaintiff in addition to establishing a prima facie case, is able to establish that he
was subjected to a constitutional deprivation caused by a municipal custom, policy, or practice.
Monell v. New York Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978). A single isolated
instance of police misconduct is insufficient to establish a policy claim. There must be allegations
of a policy "systemic in nature" that constitutes the "moving force" behind the constitutional
deprivation. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 819-20. A single decision by a person vested with final decision
making authority is, however, sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a policy. Pembaur v.
City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1986).
2. Sherrod v. Berry, 827 F.2d 195, 207 (7th Cir. 1987) (loss of life compensable to deceased's
estate under section 1983). See also Bass by Lewis v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173, 1190 (7th
Cir. 1985) (estate may recover damages for loss of life, pain and suffering, and punitive damages
where action brought under section 1983); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1240 (7th
Cir. 1984) (Wisconsin law precluding recovery to deceased's estate must succumb to section
1983 which provides for recovery to estate for loss of life); Strandell v. Jackson County, 634
F. Supp. 824 (S.D. 11. 1986) (Illinois Wrongful Death Act precluding recovery for loss of life
is inconsistent with compensatory and deterrence policies of section 1983 and is therefore not
controlling); Doty v. Carey, 626 F. Supp. 359, 363 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (recovery of damages for
loss of life under section 1983 consistent with policies of statute).
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life.3 Against a backdrop of traditional death policies that allow a decedent
to recover for consciou's pain and suffering, and surviving family members
for the economic injury to the decedent's estate, 4 the loss of the right to life
claim is revolutionary.' While compensating a person for such a loss may
appear to be an appealing result, it cannot be achieved without traversing a
complex legal terrain.
When a citizen is killed as a result of a police officer's unconstitutional
conduct, section 1983 provides a vehicle for the cause of action. 6 In general,
section 1983 affords individuals redress for deprivations of constitutional
rights perpetrated by state actors. 7 Its two primary policy objectives are to
compensate for and deter constitutional injuries." It is the sword with which
3. The Seventh Circuit has given its approval for awarding hedonic damages which are
defined as follows:
[Hedonic] derives from the word pleasing or pleasure. I believe it is a Greek word.
It is distinct from the word economic. So it refers to the larger value of life, the
life at the pleasure of society, if you will, the life-the value including economic,
including moral, including philosophical, including all the value with which you
might hold life, is the meaning of the expression 'hedonic value.'
Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159, 163 (N.D. I11. 1985), aff'd, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987).
4. See infra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
5. The English had experimented with allowing recovery for the loss of expectation of life,
but abolished such an award by statute in 1982. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir.) (police shooting), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 311 (1987); Carter v. City of Chattanooga, 803 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1986)
(police shooting of fleeing suspect in violation of fourth amendment); Fernandez v. Leonard,
784 F.2d 1209 (lst Cir. 1986) (shooting of kidnap victim by police in course of apprehending
kidnappers); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984) (police shooting and
subsequent conspiracy to prevent disclosure of true facts); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d
1495 (11 th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (beating and shooting of decedent by police constituted violation
of fourth amendment and due process), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 115 (1986); Landrum v. Moats,
576 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.) (use of excessive force caused death of deceased), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 912 (1978).
For a comprehensive compilation of earlier section 1983 wrongful death cases and an article
advocating the adoption of a federal common law wrongful death remedy under section 1983,
see Steinglass, Wrongful Death Actions and Section 1983, 60 IND. L.J. 559 (1985). See generally
S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH (2d ed. 1975) (excellent treatise on wrongful
death).
7. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (purpose of section 1983 is to provide
federal cause of action where state actors deprive individuals of constitutional rights and state
law is inadequate remedy). See generally Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of
Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1985)
(any limitations on scope of section 1983 should be viewed skeptically in light of its importance);
S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 (2d ed.
1986) (section 1983 provides vehicle to redress unconstitutional deprivations where state law is
not enforced or is inadequate).
8. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 268-69 (1981). See also
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590 (1978) (policy underlying section 1983 is compen-
sation for injuries caused by deprivation of constitutional rights); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247, 254-57 & n.9 (1978) (compensatory damages are "formidable" deterrent of unconstitutional
deprivations). Cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985) (federal interests in uniformity,
42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983
individuals enforce their constitutional rights, while the public at large reaps
an indirect benefit from the conquest. 9 But because section 1983 is essentially
an enabling statute, it affords no substantive guidance for redressing an
unconstitutional killing.10
At present, there are four analytical steps that must be taken before a
decedent's rights may be vindicated under section 1983. First, the question
of who has standing to sue on the decedent's behalf must be addressed.
Second, it must be determined whether the section 1983 action survives the
death of the decedent. Third, the Constitution must be examined to determine
the proper substantive source of redress. Fourth, and the primary focus of
this Article, a damage remedy must be fashioned to vindicate the decedent's
constitutional right not to be killed.
The Supreme Court has interpreted article III of the Constitution" as
allowing the federal courts to preside only over real cases or controversies
where the parties have a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation.' 2
This rule extends to a section 1983 action by requiring the person injured
to challenge the unconstitutional conduct. 3 Therefore, although the right of
redress for an unconstitutional killing is personal to the decedent, courts
recognize that the representative of the decedent's estate has a sufficient
personal stake to have standing to sue for the decedent's injury.' 4
certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation provide rationales for section 1983
action); Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 657 (1983) (federal policies underlying section
1983 considered in section 1988 analysis are deterrence, compensation, uniformity, and feder-
alism).
9. See Blackmun, supra note 7.
10. See City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (plurality) ("By its terms, of course,
the statute [section 1983] creates no substantive rights; it merely provides remedies for depri-
vations of rights established elsewhere."), reh'g denied, 473 U.S. 925 (1985).
11. Article III provides in relevant part: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United States.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
12. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 61-62 (1986) (Article III of the Constitution
limits power of federal courts to deciding cases and controversies; this in turn requires that
litigants have a direct stake in outcome).
13. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (federal court's judicial power exists to
redress injury to complaining party but may benefit others collaterally). See also Monaghan,
Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 296 n. 109 (1984) (section 1983 does not appear
by its terms to contemplate third party standing). Cf. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 132-38
(only person directly harmed by government action may assert rights under fourth amendment),
reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1978); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 ("Fourth
Amendment rights are personal rights which . .. may not be vicariously asserted."), reh'g
denied, 394 U.S. 939 (1969). See generally R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK, & N. YOUNG, TREATISE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 2.13(f)(2) (1986) (standing is established
when plaintiff has a "personal stake" in outcome, e.g., when he has suffered an injury that is
fairly traceable to defendant). But cf. Steinglass, supra note 6, at 654-56 (arguing that purposes
underlying section 1983 justify construing statute to allow third party standing to bring wrongful
death claim).
14. See Estate of Johnson by Castle v. Village of Libertyville, 819 F.2d 174, 177-78 (7th
1988]
522 DEPA UL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:519
The issue arises as to whether the section 1983 action "survives" the
decedent to provide the representative of the estate with an avenue for
recourse. In general, survival simply means that a decedent's claim for an
injury suffered before death is allowed to continue through the representative,
as an asset of the estate. 5 Although section 1983 does not expressly allow
for survival,1 6 Congress has provided for such an eventuality in the form of
42 U.S.C. section 1988.11 Section 1988 is a choice of law provision that
instructs federal courts to borrow from state law to define the scope of
section 1983.18 In Robertson v. Wegmann,' 9 the Supreme Court held that
section 1988 mandates reliance on state survival of claims rules to answer
the survivability issue of section 1983.20
Choosing the appropriate amendment under which to sue for an uncon-
stitutional killing is more difficult. It is unsettled whether the fourth1 or
Cir. 1987) (parents prohibited from bringing action on behalf of deceased daughter where
administrator of estate properly brought action); Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239, 245 (6th Cir.
1984) (section 1983 claim may be brought by decedent's personal representative as defined by
state law); Wilmere v. Stibolt, 152 Il. App. 3d 642, 645, 504 N.E.2d 916, 918 (1987) ("long-
standing rule" in Illinois is that "the executor or administrator of a decedent's estate has
standing to file suit on behalf of the decedent, but the legatees, heirs and devisees have no
such standing.").
15. See 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 6, § 14.1, at 408.
16. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1982) (expressly allowing for survival).
17. Section 1988 provides in relevant part:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the
provisions of the Title, and of Title "Cxvn. RiorTS," and of Title "CRIMES," for
the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their
vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the
United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in
all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions
necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common
law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein
the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the
same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall
be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause,
and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found
guilty.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
18. For detailed discussions on the workings of section 1988, see Eisenberg, State Law in
Federal Civil Rights Cases: The Proper Scope of Section 1988, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 499 (1980);
Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old Light on Section 1988, 133 U.
PA. L. REV. 601 (1985); Note, Choice of Law Under Section 1983, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 494
(1970).
19. 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
20. In Robertson, the plaintiff had filed a section 1983 claim before his death. The Court
held that a Louisiana statute that required the plaintiff's section 1983 action to abate at his
death was not inconsistent with the purpose of section 1983. Id. at 592-93. The Court further
instructed that nothing in section 1983 mandated compensating a person who sued merely as
the executor of an estate where there were no survivors, and where the constitutional violation
was not the cause of death. Id.
21. The fourth amendment provides in relevant part: "The right of the people to be secure
1988] 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983
fourteenth 22 amendments (or both) supply the source of redress for killings
by police officers23 because section 1983 is silent as to the shape of the
remedy. Recently, in Tennessee v. Garner,24 the Supreme Court held Ten-
nessee's deadly force statute unconstitutional and recognized that the fourth
amendment right against unreasonable seizures is implicated when a police
officer shoots and kills an unarmed, fleeing felon. 25 The Court, however,
only addressed the issue of the constitutionality of the statute, not the issue
of the officer's liability for killing the decedent. The lower court had
previously resolved that issue in favor of the officer on the basis of his
qualified immunity from suit because he had acted in accordance with the
statute.26 By reviewing the Tennessee statute under the fourth amendment,
the Court seems to have placed its imprimatur on a fourth amendment
objective reasonableness standard for analyzing such claims, 27 but it did not
preclude an action brought under the fourteenth amendment. 28
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated ...." U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
22. The fourteenth amendment provides in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
As Justice Stevens explains in his concurring opinion to Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986), the fourteenth amendment may be implicated in three distinct ways:
First, it incorporates specific protections defined in the Bill of Rights. Thus, the
State, as well as the Federal Government, must comply with the commands in the
First and Eighth Amendments; so too, the State must respect the guarantees in the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. Second, it contains a substantive component,
sometimes referred to as 'substantive due process,' which bars certain arbitrary
government actions 'regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement
them.' Third, it is a guarantee of fair procedure, sometimes referred to as 'procedural
due process": the State may not execute, imprison, or fine a defendant without
... providing appropriate procedural safeguards (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 337.
23. See, e.g., Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (plaintiff
successfully asserted section 1983 claim under both fourth and fourteenth amendments), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986). See generally Comment, Excessive Force Claims: Removing the
Double Standard, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 1369 (1986) ("[h]istory and precedent support [the use
of] both standards" to address deprivations caused by police officer's use of excessive force).
24. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
25. Id. at 11.
26. Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 600 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1979) (policeman who shot
fleeing suspect entitled to good faith immunity). Cf. Trejo v. Wattles, 654 F. Supp. 1143 (D.
Colo. 1987) (officers who shot individual acted reasonably under circumstances and were entitled
to qualified immunity); Washington v. Starke, 626 F. Supp. 1149 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (qualified
immunity defense available to officer where violation of constitutional rights is objectively
reasonable). See also Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3043 (1987) (officer is immunized for
objectively reasonable mistakes).
27. Such cases are to be analyzed by "balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the intrusion
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Under the fourteenth amendment, a state actor must engage in conduct
that qualitatively "shocks the conscience'' 29 before a constitutional injury
occurs.3 0 In this society, a police officer is sometimes justified when he shoots
on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental
interests alleged to justify the intrusion." Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (quoting
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). Use of deadly force against a fleeing felon
is an unreasonable seizure under the fourth amendment unless (1) it is necessary to prevent the
suspect's escape and, where feasible, warning has been given, or (2) the officer has probable
cause to believe that the offender poses a serious threat of death or serious physical injury to
the officer or others. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12.
There must be a seizure before the fourth amendment is triggered. Cameron v. City of
Pontiac, 813 F.2d 782, 784 (6th Cir. 1987). In Cameron, the decedent had been struck and
killed by an automobile while he was fleeing from police officers who were shooting at him.
Because the decedent had not been "seized," the court held that the plaintiff failed to state a
claim under the fourth amendment. Id.
Other circuits have utilized fourth amendment principles to analyze an allegedly unconstitu-
tional killing. See, e.g., Lundgren v. McDaniel, 814 F.2d 600, 602-03 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(officers' conduct examined under fourth amendment's "objectively reasonable" standard),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986); Patterson v. Fuller, 654 F. Supp. 418, 425-27 (N.D. Ga.
1987) (section 1983 action seeking redress of fourth amendment violation is analyzed under
such standards).
Whether negligent conduct can give rise to a claim under the fourth amendment is as yet an
unresolved question. CompareYoung v. City of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349, 1353 (5th Cir. 1985)
(negligence not enough to implicate fourth amendment) with Patterson v. Fuller, 654 F. Supp.
418, 427 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (police officer acting negligently in cocking gun provided basis for
fourth amendment violation where arrestee was shot and killed).
28. Several circuits have analyzed an unconstitutional killing in whole or in part under the
fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Nishiyama v. Dickson County, 814 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1987)
(fourteenth amendment guarantees that state may not deprive individual of life without due
process); Patterson, 654 F. Supp. at 421-25 (police shooting constitutes fourteenth amendment
violation); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1499-1501 (11th Cir. 1985) (shooting
death of decedent by police constitutes deprivation of substantive due process under fourteenth
amendment).
Many of the cases analyzing an unconstitutional killing under the fourteenth amendment
have found that negligence on the part of the state actor was not enough to implicate a
fourteenth amendment action. See Dodd v. City of Norwich, 827 F.2d 1, 3 (2d Cir. 1987);
Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408, 1413-14 (9th Cir. 1986); Dunster v. Metropolitan
Dade County, 791 F.2d 1516, 1518 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 293 (1987); Young
v. City of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349, 1353 (5th Cir. 1985); Hewitt v. City of Truth or Consequences,
758 F.2d 1375, 1378-79 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985); Jackson v. City of Joliet,
715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
Judge Easterbrook has criticized the practice of utilizing the doctrine of substantive due
process under the fourteenth amendment in excessive force cases because the fourth amendment
is substantively on point and provides well established objective guidelines. See Gumz v.
Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1404-09 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J., concurring), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1123 (1986). The Seventh Circuit adopted this reasoning in Lester v. City of Chicago,
830 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1987). The Fifth Circuit, however, apparently finds the choice of
amendment inconsequential. See Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1209-11, reh'g denied, 776
F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1985).
29. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
30. Of course, defining conduct that shocks the conscience is a cryptic task at best. Judge
Friendly has developed the following formulation:
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and kills a suspect because police officers are all too often confronted with
situations that require split-second decisions which have life-or-death con-
sequences." Accidental or negligent shootings by police officers do not violate
the fourteenth amendment.12 Under the Johnson v. Glick3  standard for
evaluating excessive force cases under section 1983, a police officer is not
liable under the fourteenth amendment unless his use of force is inspired by
malice. 14
Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a
judge's chambers, violates . . constitutional rights. In determining whether the
constitutional line has been crossed, a court must look to such factors as the need
for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of
force that was used, the extent of the injury inflicted, and whether force was applied
in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically
for the very purpose of causing harm.
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
Most of the circuits have adopted Judge Friendly's formulation in whole or in part. See,
e.g., Dale v. Janklow, 828 F.2d 481, 484-85 (8th Cir. 1987) (conduct must be egregious);
Graham v. City of Charlotte, 827 F.2d 945, 948 (4th Cir. 1987) (conduct must be applied
"maliciously and sadistically" in light of all facts and circumstances as "descriptions of degrees
of force"); McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 785 (9th Cir. 1986) (malicious action for
purpose of causing harm constitutes violation of fourteenth amendment); Gumz v. Morrissette,
772 F.2d 1395, 1400 (7th Cir. 1985) (not every injury inflicted by state official is actionable
under section 1983), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1123 (1986); Norris v. District of Columbia, 737
F.2d 1148, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (constitutional claim may lie where force used by state actor
grossly exceeds that warranted by situation); Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1333 (10th Cir.
1981) (action must be disproportionate in relation to need presented and conducted with malice);
Schillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1981) (in determining whether injury inflicted
by state actor rises to level of constitutional violation, court must consider whether action was
grossly disproportionate to need for action); Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 95-96 (1st Cir.)
(correct standard for finding liability is whether conduct is shocking or violative of universal
standards of decency) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 (1979). But see Lester v. City of Chicago,
830 F.2d 706, 711-12 (7th Cir. 1987) (court adopted fourth amendment objective reasonableness
standard and rejected fourteenth amendment's "shock the conscience standard").
31. See generally Geller, Officer Restraint in the Use of Deadly Force: The Next Frontier
in Police Shooting Research, 13 J. POLICE Sc. & ADMIN. 153 (1985) (arguing for a method to
systematically study police's use of excessive force in "high risk" situations); K. MATULIA, A
BALANCE OF FORCES: MODEL DEADLY FORCE POLICY AND PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1985) ("The
officer must make the 'deadly force decision' quickly when a generalized unknown danger may
be anticipated, keeping in mind his own safety, the protection of innocent bystanders, and the
rights of the individual accused."); W. GELLER & K. KARALES, SPLIT-SECOND DECISIONS:
SHOOTINGS OF & BY CHICAGO POLICE (1981) (some police shootings are unavoidable).
32. See supra note 28. The fact that the officer was responsible for creating the situation
where his negligence resulted in the decedent being killed apparently does not matter. Young
v. City of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349, 1353 (5th Cir. 1985). But cf. Patterson, 654 F. Supp. at 425
(police officer who negligently cocked gun could be held liable under section 1983 for fourth
amendment violation).
33. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973).
34. See supra note 30. But cf. Nishiyama v. Dickson County, 814 F.2d 277, 280-81 (6th
Cir. 1987) (en banc) (gross negligence of law enforcement personnel in entrusting sheriff's
vehicle to a convicted felon who used vehicle to pull over decedent's car and kill her, was
actionable).
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Once the section 1983 action is deemed to survive and the appropriate
substantive source of law has been discerned, section 1988 is called into play
for a second time to forge a meaningful remedial structure to simplify the
formidable task of valuing the important constitutional rights violated when
an officer kills a person without justification.35 Because state wrongful death
remedies have evolved to contravene the common law rule against recovery
for death and are uniformly statutory, 6 they are obvious candidates for
adoption under section 1988. 37
Remedies available for death under state law most commonly fall within
two broad categories: hybrid survival statutes and parallel survival-wrongful
death statutes.3 8 A hybrid survival statute allows a decedent, through his
estate, to recover for injuries suffered prior to death and for the economic
injury to the estate as a result of the decedent's death.3 9 A survival-wrongful
death statutory scheme allows for two parallel but distinct actions: a survival
action on behalf of the decedent for personal injury arising prior to death,
and a wrongful death action for injury to the decedent's estate on behalf of
select family members for their broadly defined economic interest in the
decedent.4
35. Even though section 1988 has not been invoked in other fourth amendment cases relating
to unlawful seizures, section 1988 is implicated in fourth amendment death cases. In those
fourth amendment cases where the Supreme Court has ignored section 1988, state law is not
borrowed because it simply reflects or codifies the common law, e.g., false arrest. In a death
case, however, an action for death did not exist at common law and state statutes arose to
abrogate this harsh rule. Accordingly, adoption of state law in this particular fourth amendment
context is compelling.
36. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
37. Even though the action borrows state law, it remains a federal action. See Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269 (1985).
38. See generally F. HARPER, F. JAMES, & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 24.1-24.3,
24.13-24.18 (2d ed. 1986) (analyzes scope and application of wrongful death and survival
statutes); W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 942-60 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON) (describing nature of action for
wrongful death); S. SPEISER, supra note 6 (wrongful death actions under common law, state
and federal statutes).
39. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 556.12 (1974), which provides as follows:
If the administrator of the deceased party is plaintiff, and the death of such party
was caused by the injury complained of in the action, the mental and physical pain
suffered by the deceased in consequence of the injury, the reasonable expenses
occasioned to his estate by the injury, the probable duration of his life but for the
injury, and his capacity to earn money during his probable working life, may be
considered as elements of damage in connection with other elements alleged by law
in the same manner as if the decedent had survived.
Id.
40. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110-1/2, para. 27-6 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, paras.
1 & 2 (1985). Paragraph 27-6 provides:
Actions which survive. In addition to the actions which survive by the common
law, the following also survive: actions of replevin, actions to recover damages for
an injury to the person (except slander and libel), actions to recover damages for
an injury to real or personal property or for the detention or conversion of personal
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In Part I, this Article will discuss the nature of the loss of the right to
life claim as it has evolved in the Seventh Circuit, and will introduce the
reader to the cases recognizing such a right. Then, in Part II, it will present
essential background on choice of law under section 1988 as well as basic
damage principles under section 1983. In Part III, it will examine the basis
for the loss of the right to life claim and criticize the courts' rejection of
state remedies. Finally, in Part IV, it will suggest that the action for civil
redress of an unconstitutional killing during arrest is one to be found in the
fourth, not fourteenth amendment, and will set forth the proper remedial
framework for affording relief to a decedent's estate.
I. THE NATURE OF THE Loss OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE CLAIM
It is elementary that life is the most fundamental right known to man.41
A person whose life is taken from him has certainly suffered an injury of
virtually unquantifiable magnitude, yet he can never be personally compen-
sated precisely because he has died. The loss of the right to life claim has
arisen as an attempt to supply a remedy for the wrongful taking of life by
persons acting under the cloak of state governmental authority-the most
common scenario involving a situation where a police officer shoots and
property, actions against officers for misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance of
themselves or their deputies, actions for fraud or deceit [and under an act relating
to alcoholic liquors].
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110-1/2, para. 27-6 (1985).
Paragraphs 1 and 2 provide in relevant part:
1. Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or
default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued,
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect
thereof, then and in every such case the person who or company or corporation
which would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action
for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the
death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony.
2. Every such action shall be brought by and in the names of the personal
representatives of such deceased person, and . . . the amount recovered in every
such action shall be for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and next of
kin of such deceased person in every such action the jury may give such damages
as they shall deem a fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary
injuries resulting from such death, to the surviving spouse and next of kin of such
deceased person.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, paras. 1 & 2 (1985).
See Note, Wrongful Death in Illinois, 62 Cr.[-]KENT L. REV. 75 (1985). See generally M.
POLELLE & B. OTTLEY, ILLINoIs TORT LAW 502-10 (1985) (heirs may bring suit under Wrongful
Death Act and recover for their pecuniary loss; estate may bring action under Survival Act to
recover what deceased could have recovered had he lived).
41. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985) ("fundamental interest in [one's] own
life need not be elaborated upon"); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 (1978) (right to
life fundamental).
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kills a suspect.4 2 Those courts that have recognized the loss of the right to
life claim have treated it as a violation of substantive due process under the
fourteenth amendment.43 The Supreme Court, however, never has held that
there has been a deprivation of life without due process in the context of a
police shooting. 44
In Guyton v. Phillips,45 a California district court for the first time held
that a decedent's estate could recover under the fourteenth amendment for
loss of the right to life. In Guyton, the police officer shot an apparently
unarmed, fleeing black teenager in the back. While finding the California
survival statute inconsistent for failing to allow recovery for pain and
suffering, 46 the court never considered adopting the state's wrongful death
statute to provide a remedial framework. The district court simply created
a separate right of recovery under section 1983 on behalf of the decedent
for the loss of his "right to life.'' 47
Later, in a notorious case of police misconduct, Bell v. City of Milwau-
kee,4s the Seventh Circuit, relying on Guyton, became the first circuit to
recognize a section 1983 action for loss of the right to life as a matter of
federal common law. 49 Bell not only involved a completely unjustifiable
police shooting, but also a twenty year cover-up of the incident. As mandated
by section 1988, the court examined the Wisconsin survival and wrongful
death statutes in its search to provide a remedy. Since the Wisconsin statutes
placed significant limitations on the amount of damages recoverable, the
court found the statutes inconsistent and proceeded to create an action on
behalf of the decedent for loss of the right to life.5 0
42. See supra notes 6 & 31. See also Bouza, Myths and Hard Truths About Police
Shootings, 13 TUL. L. REv. 337 (1982) (police sometimes justified in shooting suspect); J. FYFE,
READINGS ON POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE (Police Foundation 1982) ("Police often use their
firearms as the last resort against real and imminent peril; they often have no choice but to
shoot.").
43. See Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 651 F. Supp. 1248 (E.D. Wash. 1987); Linzie v. City
of Columbia, 651 F. Supp. 740 (W.D. Mo. 1986); Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp 1154 (N.D.
Cal. 1981). See generally R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK, & N. YOUNG, supra note 13, at §§ 15.1-
15.4 (evolution of substantive due process).
44. City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 817 n.4, reh'g denied, 473 U.S. 925 (1985).
45. 532 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
46. Id. at 1166. California Probate Code § 573 limited damages to "such loss or damage
as the decedent sustained or incurred prior to his death, including any penalties or punitive or
exemplary damages that the decedent would have been entitled to recover had he lived, and
shall not include damages for pain, suffering, and disfigurement." Id. at 1164 (quoting CAL.
PROB. CODE § 573 (West 1956) (repealed 1988)).
47. Id. at 1168. The district court awarded $100,000 to the decedent's estate on that claim.
Id.
48. 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984). The opinion is an extensive one, complete with a table
of contents, and considers many issues in addition to the loss of life action. The Bell case
received a great deal of notoriety, including a feature segment on 60 Minutes (CBS television
broadcast). S. SPEISER, supra note 6, at 28.
49. 746 F.2d at 1238-40.
50. Id. at 1234-41.
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While Bell at first appeared to be an anomaly, the Seventh Circuit has
since extended its holding to allow recovery for loss of life in Bass by Lewis
v. Wallenstein,51 and its most recent decision of Sherrod v. Berry.2 In Bass,
the decedent's estate brought an action under the eighth and fourteenth
amendments and alleged that the decedent, a prison inmate, died of cardio-
respiratory arrest as a result of the prison official's deliberate indifference. 3
The court held that Illinois survival and wrongful death statutes, which
placed no limits on recovery, were "inconsistent" with the objectives of
section 1983, specifically because they failed to allow recovery for loss of
life.54 The court apparently considered any state statute that fails to allow
recovery for loss of life to be per se inconsistent with federal civil rights
objectives.
In Sherrod, the Seventh Circuit held that the reasoning in Bell and Bass
should be applied to a case where an unarmed black man was shot to death
as he reached for his driver's license during a traffic stop.55 The Seventh
Circuit not only reaffirmed Bell and Bass but also affirmed the district
court's decision to allow an expert witness to give testimony on the "hedonic
value" of life.56
In order to analyze critically the recent development of the loss of the
right to life precedent, a brief discussion of section 1988 choice of law
principles is essential. The policies underlying state death remedies must then
be compared to the objectives of section 1983 in providing for vindication
of violations of constitutional rights. Familiarity with the rules of damages
recoverable under section 1983 is also essential.
II. BACKGROUND: CHOICE OF LAW AND DAMAGES
A. Choice Of Law Under Section 1988
Section 1988 was originally enacted as section 3 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866.17 While there are numerous decisions concerning section 1988's
attorney's fee provision," relatively few decisions have attempted to interpret
51. 769 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1985).
52. 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987).
53. 769 F.2d at 1177-83.
54. Id. at 1189-90.
55. 827 F.2d at 207.
56. Id. at 205-06. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (formerly codified as R.S. 722 of the Judiciary Act; originally
enacted on April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27, reenacted May 31, 1870, § 18, 16 Stat. 144).
58. See, e.g., City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (no requirement that attorney's
fees awarded be proportionate to amount of plaintiff's damages); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424 (1983) (setting out standards for awarding attorney's fees). See also Comment,
Attorney's Fees in Damage Actions Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976, 47 U. Cm. L. REV. 332 (1980) (citing many cases that discuss section 1988 attorney's
fees provision).
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its choice of law provision.5 9 Although this provision reads very simply, it
has proved an interpretative hydra. 60 The Supreme Court has recently made
significant strides, however, to simplify section 1988 analysis. 61 Before a
court utilizes section 1988 principles, it must first find federal law "deficient"
on the point in question.62 Once federal law is deemed deficient, the next
step is to look to the statutory law of the forum state and adopt the
"appropriate" or "analogous" forum state provision. 63 If such a provision
exists, it will be borrowed as the federal rule. But because it is the federal
interest that predominates, a forum state provision will be rejected if it is
"inconsistent" with the policies underlying the federal civil rights law.r6 If
the forum state's law is rejected as inconsistent, federal common law will
be created. 65
1. When is federal law deficient?
A district court must first search for an avenue of redress under federal
law before it may borrow from state law. It should limit its consideration,
however, to specifically dispositive federal statutes. 66 Section 1988 analysis
59. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985); Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42 (1984);
Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650 (1983); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478
(1980); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S.
454 (1975); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
A number of earlier decisions addressed section 1988 (denominated as either R.S. 722 or §
3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866) tangentially. United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407
(1920); Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916); Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152
U.S. 454 (1894).
60. The confusion started early. Compare United States v. Mitchell, 136 F. 896, 909 (C.C.D.
Or. 1905) ("there is no ambiguity whatever in [section 1988]") with Tennessee v. Davis, 100
U.S. 257, 299 (1879) (Clifford, J., dissenting) (dictum) ("[eixamined in the most favorable
light, [section 1988] is a mere jumble of federal law, common law, and state law, consisting
of incongruous and irreconcilable regulations, which in legal effect, amounts to no more than
a direction to a judge ... [to do] as well as he can."). This confusion continues today.
Compare Kreimer, supra note 18, at 622-28 (section 1988 applies to actions filed originally in
federal courts) with Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 525-43 (section 1988 only applies to actions
removed from state courts to federal courts).
61. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
62. Id. at 267. "Federal law" means federal statutory law, and federal law is deficient
when there is "no directly dispositive federal statute." Kreimer, supra note 18, at 620 n.92.
See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589 n.4 (1978) (refusing to borrow survival provision
contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1982)).
63. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 267 (quoting Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454,
462 (1975) ("appropriate") and Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1980)
("analogous")).
64. 471 U.S. at 269.
65. A reference to federal common law in this Article means judge-made federal law created
by construing a federal statute, subject to congressional modification. See Merrill, The Common
Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985). See also Morgan v. South Bend
Community School Corp., 797 F.2d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 1986) (listing other articles).
66. See supra note 62.
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has been invoked in areas where there clearly is no federal rule, and ipso
facto federal law is "deficient." Generally, state law has been borrowed to
resolve statute of limitation 67 and survival of claims 6 questions. Similarly,
section 1988 analysis has been invoked in the search to provide a remedy
for the unconstitutional taking of life. 69 The deficiency question has proved
a simple hurdle because there is no specifically dispositive statute or Supreme
Court decision aimed at redressing an unconstitutional killing. Section 1988
mandates resort to state law to fill this interstitial void, so long as state law
is not "inconsistent" with federal policies.
2. When is state law inconsistent?
The Supreme Court has yet to provide any clear guidelines for determining
when state law is inconsistent with federal policies. Generally, state law is
inconsistent "if it fails to take into account practicalities that are involved
in litigating federal civil rights claims and policies that are analogous to the
goals of the Civil Rights Acts." 70 A state rule apparently must be "system-
ically hostile" before a federal court may reject it and create federal common
law. 7' A state statute will not be rejected simply because the plaintiff may
lose the litigation or because the adoption of state rules may result in
discordant outcomes throughout the different jurisdictions. 7 Since the pol-
icies underlying the federal enactment must be furthered and consistent with
the borrowed state provisions, the aims of section 1983 must be compared
with the objectives of state death remedies.
The proclaimed policy aims of section 1983 are to compensate for and
deter civil rights violations 4. 7 Section 1983 itself is not a substantive provision,
but merely affords an avenue of redress for rights created elsewhere.75
Accordingly, section 1983 has been used as a vehicle for lawsuits as varied
as racial discrimination in public employment and the use of excessive force
67. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
68. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
69. See supra notes 2 & 6 and accompanying text.
70. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 50 (1984).
71. See Morgan v. South Bend Community School Corp., 797 F.2d 471, 475 (7th Cir.
1986).
72. Robertson, 436 U.S. at 593. The Court stated:
A state statute cannot be considered 'inconsistent' with federal law merely because
it causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation. If success of the § 1983 action were the
only benchmark, there would be no reason at all to look to state law, for the
appropriate rule would then always be the one favoring the plaintiff, and its source
would be essentially irrelevant. But § 1988 quite clearly instructs us to refer to state
statutes; it does not say that state law is to be accepted or rejected based solely on
which side is advantaged thereby.
Id.
73. See Burnett, 468 U.S. at 52 n.14; Robertson, 436 U.S. at 593 n.ll.
74. See supra note 8.
75. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
1988]
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
by police officers.76 Section 1983, dormant for more than ninety years, has,
since Monroe v. Pape" in 1961, become a powerful tool for vindicating
violations of fundamental constitutional rights, as well as the subject of
great controversy and abuse.78 Recognizing the potential for substantial
overlap between state causes of action and those available under section
1983, the Supreme Court has sought to limit the reach of the statute to
deprivations of constitutional magnitude. 79
Section 1983 is commonly recognized as creating a body of constitutional
torts.8 0 The Court recently explained that "[tihe atrocities that concerned
Congress in 1871 plainly sounded in tort" and found "tort analogies com-
pelling in establishing the elements of a cause of action under [section]
1983."'  Constitutional torts can be conceptualized as a highly specialized
supplement to tort law. 2 Where tort doctrine is designed to prevent a person
from harming his neighbor-what Dean Prosser called the "prophylactic
factor"S3-and to compensate the injured party if so harmed, section 1983
seeks to prevent those who bear the aegis of governmental authority from
depriving a person of rights secured by the Constitution, and to compensate
him if he is so harmed. 4 The query thus becomes whether state survival and
wrongful death statutes are compatible with the objectives of section 1983.
Under the common law, the maxim actio personalis mortitur cum persona,
signifying that death gave rise to no causes of action, ruled the day.85 This
76. See Blackmun, supra note 7, at 19-20; Love, Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of
Constitutional Rights, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 1242 (1979).
77. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), rev'd in part by Monell v. New York Dep't of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 663 (1978).
78. Blackmun, supra note 7, at 2.
79. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). See also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327 (1986) (negligent action insufficient to trigger constitutional scrutiny); Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517 (1984) (prisoners have lowered privacy expectation for fourth amendment pur-
poses).
80. See Kreimer, supra note 18, at 604; Love, supra note 76; Schnapper, Civil Rights
Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (1979); Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79
MICH. L. REV. 5 (1980).
81. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 277 (1985). Similarly, the Court has resorted to
tort analogies in actions against federal actors, or what is commonly referred to as a Bivens
action. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). See also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) ("Whenever the relevant state survival
statute would abate a Bivens-type action brought against defendants whose conduct results in
death, the federal common law allows survival."); Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The
Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972) (analysis of Court's reasoning in
Bivens, and nature of a Bivens-type action).
82. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 272 (quoting McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 672
(1963)). Traditional tort remedies may not have been available to persons wronged by state
actors at the time section 1983 was enacted because of a complex network of tort immunities
that shielded municipalities and its officers from tort liability. City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471
U.S. 808, 818 n.5, reh'g denied, 473 U.S. 925 (1985).
83. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 38, at 25-26.
84. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
85. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970); Thompson v. Estate of
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rule was articulated in the much criticized English case of Baker v. Bolton,16
and blindly followed for years by English and American courts alike . 7 It
was then commonly stated that it was less expensive to kill a man than to
scratch him."s This result being anthema to a civilized society, the English
adopted Lord Campbell's Act of 1846, the historical antecedent to modern
American wrongful death statutes. 89 Every state now has its own statutory
remedy for wrongful death.9° While the state statutory schemes are diverse,
they generally fall into two categories: hybrid survival statutes9l and parallel
survival and wrongful death statutory schemes92 (with the notable exception
of a purely punitive wrongful death statute unique to Alabama).9
Hybrid survival statutes entitle the administrator or executor of the de-
ceased's estate to bring a personal injury action for any pain and suffering
the decedent incurred prior to death and to recover for the economic injury
to the estate incurred as a result of death. 94 Beneficiaries share in the damages
as they are funneled through the decedent's estate. The majority of states,
however, provide for two distinct but parallel actions for survival and
wrongful death. Under a typical survival statute, the decedent's estate is
entitled to recover for the decedent's pain and suffering. 95 Under a wrongful
death statute, the representative of the decedent's estate is entitled to sue
Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1982). See also Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17
STAN. L. REV. 1043 (1965) (discussing English history which precluded recovery for killings);
Miller, Dead People in Torts: A Second Installment, 22 CATH. U.L. REv. 73 (1972) (discussing
common law position); Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND.
L. REV. 605 (1960) (two English common law principles that ruled the day were that "a personal
action dies with the person" and "the killing of a human being is not a ground for an action
for damages").
86. 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
87. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
88. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 38, at 942. Dean Prosser offered the following
anecdote:
Most lawyers are familiar with the legend, quite unfounded, that this was the
original reason that passengers in Pullman car berths rode with their heads to the
front. Also that the fire axes in railroad coaches were provided to enable the
conductor to deal efficiently with those who were merely injured.
Id.
See also I S. SPEISER, supra note 6, at 9-16 (presenting criticisms of harsh rule denying
recovery of damages for killings).
89. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 38, at 945.
90. Id. at 945. See I S. SPEISER, supra note 6, at 16-17 & App. A.
91. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 38, at 949-50 & n.57.
92. Id. at 950.
93. See, e.g., Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (finding
application of ALA. CODE § 6-5-410 (1975) consistent with aims of section 1983); Carter v. City
of Birmingham, 444 So. 2d 373, 375 (Ala. 1983) (Alabama only allows survival of a wrongful
death action and only punitive damages may be recovered), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1211 (1984).
94. See I S. SPEISER, supra note 6, § 3.2, at 117-19; 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 6, § 14.3, at
746.
95. See 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 6, § 14.6, at 758.
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for the injury to the estate caused by the decedent's death. 96 "Pecuniary
injuries" is somewhat of a misnomer, however, often consisting of damages
for such intangibles as loss of society, love and affection, and loss of
consortium. 97 Damages for the decedent's lost expected life's pleasures are
not recoverable.9"
B. Damages Recoverable Under Section 1983
The ultimate objective of any action for redress of an unconstitutional
killing is to recover damages. In Carey v. Piphus,99 the Supreme Court made
its first attempt to clarify the rules of damages under section 1983. In Carey,
the plaintiffs claimed that they were deprived of procedural due process
under the fourteenth amendment when they were expelled from school
without a prior adjudicatory hearing. The Court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that damages should be presumed when a constitutional violation
is proved, and stated that tort damage principles apply with equal force to
actions under section 1983.00 In addition, the Court noted that "[t]o the
extent that Congress intended that awards under [section] 1983 should deter
the deprivation of constitutional rights, there is no evidence that it meant
to establish a deterrent more formidable than that inherent in the award of
compensatory damages."'' o
In Smith v. Wade, 02 the Supreme Court for the first time addressed the
issue of whether punitive damages were awardable under section 1983. The
Court answered this question affirmatively and emphasized that without such
an option the deterrent purpose of section 1983 would be thwarted.' 3 It
concluded that "reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiff's rights, as
well as intentional violations of federal law, should be sufficient to trigger
a jury's consideration of the appropriateness of punitive damages."'04
More recently, the Court addressed the question of whether a plaintiff
could recover damages based on the value or importance of the constitutional
right involved. In Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura,05 the
Court answered the question negatively. In Stachura, the plaintiff, a seventh-
grade teacher, was suspended for showing as a part of his life science course
96. See 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 6, § 3.2, at 63.
97. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 38, at 951-52; 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 6, § 3.58, at
257-58.
98. See O'Leary v. United States Lines Co., 111 F. Supp. 745, 747 (D. Mass. 1953);
Wooldridge v. Woolett, 96 Wash. 2d 659, 664, 638 P.2d 566, 570 (1981) (en banc); Prunty v.
Schwantes, 40 Wis. 2d 418, 422-25, 162 N.W.2d 34, 37-39 (1968).
99. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
100. Id. at 253-54.
101. Id. at 256-57.
102. 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
103. Id. at 48-50.
104. Id. at 51.
105. 477 U.S. 299 (1986).
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pictures of his wife during pregnancy, as well as two county health depart-
ment films dealing with human growth and sexuality.'°6 At the close of the
case, the trial court's instructions allowed the jury to consider the value of
the constitutional right violated in its damage calculation.10 7 Liability was
established at trial and substantial compensatory damages were awarded to
the plaintiff. 0 8 In attempting to justify the damage award, the plaintiff
argued that Carey could be distinguished because it involved only a violation
of procedural due process, whereas he had claimed a violation of a substan-
tive constitutional right.109 In rejecting this argument, the Court once again
stressed that tort damage principles play an important role in section 1983
damage actions," 0 and that the abstract value of a violation of a substantive
constitutional guarantee is not a proper basis for awarding damages."' The
Court further explained that "whatever the constitutional basis for [section]
1983 liability, such damages must always be designed 'to compensate injuries
caused by the [constitutional] deprivation.I" 2
III. DiscussioN AND CRITICISM-STARE DECisis GONE AWRY
In Robertson v. Wegmann, "3 the Supreme Court held that a state statute
that caused a plaintiff's civil rights action to abate at his death was not
inconsistent with section 1983. Yet the Court left open the question of
whether it would reach the same result if the constitutional deprivation itself
106. Id. at 300-01.
107. Id. at 302. The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
If you find that the Plaintiff has been deprived of a Constitutional right, you
may award damages to compensate him for the deprivation. Damages for this type
of injury are more difficult to measure than damages for a physical injury or injury
to one's property. There are no medical bills or other expenses by which you can
judge how much compensation is appropriate. In one sense, no monetary value we
place upon Constitutional rights can measure their importance in our society or
compensate a citizen adequately for their [sic] deprivation. However, just because
these rights are not capable of precise evaluation does not mean that an appropriate
monetary amount should not be awarded.
The precise value you place upon any Constitutional right which you find was
denied to Plaintiff is within your discretion. You may wish to consider the impor-
tance of the right in our system of government, the role which this right has played
in the history of our republic, [and] the significance of the right in the context of
the activities which the Plaintiff was engaged in at the time of the violation of the
right.
Id. at 302-03.
108. Id. at 303. The jury awarded the plaintiff $275,000.00 in compensatory damages and
$46,000.00 in punitive damages. The district court reduced the award to $266,750.00 and
$36,000.00 respectively.Id.
109. Id. at 309. The Court provides a number of cases both adopting and rejecting this
argument. Id. at 304 n.5.
110. Id. at 308.
111. Id. at 309-10.
112. Id. at 309 (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 265 (1978)) (emphasis in original).
113. 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
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had caused the plaintiff's death."14 It is in this precedential vacuum that the
loss of life action under section 1983 has arisen. While Guyton and Bell can
be explained as "hard cases,""' 5 the sweeping recognition of a right to
recovery for loss of life in Bass and Sherrod is much more troubling. In
these cases, the Seventh Circuit rejected as inconsistent with federal law a
state survival and wrongful death scheme that was more malleable and
significantly less limiting than those previously rejected, and in most respects
reflected the state of the art in tort recovery for death." 6
Because a decision is only as strong as the foundation upon which it rests,
the Guyton decision requires close scrutiny since it is the foundational
underpinning for the Seventh Circuit's recognition of a right to recovery for
loss of life. The California district court's outrage at the wrongful taking of
a young life is understandable, yet, its unbridled judicial activism is not." 7
The district court in Guyton followed the section 1988 analysis of Rob-
ertson and found California's survival provision, allowing no recovery for
pain and suffering, inconsistent with the aims of section 1983.18 After
comparing the survival statutes of other states, the court fashioned a survival
remedy consistent with those laws as the federal rule in the case and awarded
$15,000 in damages to the decedent's estate for pain and suffering."19
The district court next examined California's parallel, but separate, wrong-
ful death provision, and found it adequate. 2 0 The wrongful death action
114. Id. at 589-91.
115. "Hard cases" are defined as "judicial decisions which, to meet a case of hardship to
a party, are not entirely consonant with the true principle of the law. It is said of such: 'Hard
cases make bad law."' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 646 (5th ed. 1979).
116. Sherrod v. Berry, 827 F.2d 195, 207 (7th Cir. 1987); Bass by Lewis v. Wallenstein, 769
F.2d 1173, 1189-90 (7th Cir. 1985). See also Moruzi v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 771 F.2d
338, 339-40 (7th Cir. 1985) (discussing scope of recovery under Illinois Death Act).
117. The doctrine of "stare decisis" requires courts to abstain from creating new law and
follow the precedent of past decisions. Specifically, stare decisis is the:
Policy of courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point. Doctrine
that, when court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain
state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where
facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties and property are
the same. Under doctrine a deliberate or solemn decision of court made after
argument on question of law fairly arising in the case, and necessary to its deter-
mination, is an authority, or is binding precedent in the same court, or in other
courts of equal or lower rank in subsequent cases where the very point is again in
controversy.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1261 (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted). See Colby v. J.C. Penney,
Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1122-24 (7th Cir. 1987). See generally Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM.
L. REV. 735 (1949) ("[Tlhere will be no equal justice under law if a negligence rule is applied
in the morning but not in the afternoon."); Note, The Power That Shall be Vested in a
Precedent: Stare Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U.L. REv. 345 (1986)
(stare decisis takes capricious element out of the law and gives stability to society).
118. 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (citing Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S.
584, 593-94 n.11 (1978)).
119. Id. at 1167 & n.6.
120. Id. at 1167.
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could not be pursued as a pendent claim, however, because when the plaintiff
had previously attempted to bring such an action in the state court, it was
dismissed for failure to comply with the statute of limitations."' This,
however, did not preclude the district court from borrowing the state statute
under section 1988 as a damage template for the decedent's estate's civil
rights claim.
Nevertheless, the district court ignored the wrongful death statute for
adoption and opted instead to create a separate federal right of recovery for
"loss of the right to life,"' 122 claiming that it was empowered to "use any
available remedy to make good the wrong done.' 1 23 It must be emphasized
that the court created the loss of life claim, not on the basis of an articulated
inconsistency of state wrongful death policies, but purely as a matter of
judicial invention to implement the district court's perception of the objec-
tives of section 1983.124
121. Id. at 1167 & n.7.
122. Id. at 1168. The district court's categorization of the claim as an injury to the person
of the decedent rather than to his estate poses an interesting analytical problem. A person
cannot lose his right to life until he is dead. Several courts have held that a person's civil rights
cannot be violated once he is dead. See Guyton v. Phillips, 606 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 916 (1980); Whitehurst v. Wright, 592 F.2d 834, 840-41 (5th Cir. 1979);
Cartwright v. City of Concord, 618 F. Supp. 722, 730 (N.D. Cal. 1985); McQurter v. City of
Atlanta, 572 F. Supp. 1401, 1419 (N.D. Ga. 1983), appeal dismissed, 724 F.2d 881 (1984).
Because the loss of the right to life claim cannot vest until death has occurred, the loss of life
claim may very well die with the decedent. Cf. O'Leary v. United States Lines Co., Ill F.
Supp. 745, 747 (D. Mass. 1953) (court refused to adopt English rule which would allow recovery
for "decedent's loss of 'a predominantly happy life'); Wooldridge v. Woolett, 96 Wash. 2d
659, 666, 638 P.2d 566, 570 (1981) (en banc) ("We believe that the loss of the ability to enjoy
life's pleasures and amenities is not an asset to be accumulated by the deceased.") (emphasis
in original); Prunty v. Schwantes, 40 Wis. 2d 418, 423-24, 162 N.W.2d 34, 38 (1968)(loss of
right to life claim dies with decedent since after death, one can no longer be compensated). On
the other hand, if death is considered to be an injury proximately caused by the constitutional
injury inflicted prior to death, death should be considered as an element of the damages for
the constitutional violation. See infra text Part IV. C.
123. Guyton, 532 F. Supp. at 1167-68 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
The court stated: "The court must be able to fashion a remedy that will fit the penalty to the
deprivation and will serve as a deterrent to abusive conduct in the future." Id. at 1167. The
court's reliance on Bell v. Hood is misplaced, however. Bell was an action against FBI agents
for, inter alia, violating the fourth amendment. Today, this action is characterized as a Bivens
action. See supra note 81, where reference to state law under section 1988 is not an issue. Even
so, Bell's reference to searching for an available remedy was itself deferential to state law. Bell
v. Hood, 327 U.S. at 684-85.
124. But cf. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555 (1980), where the Court
gave the following admonition:
It is a commonplace that courts will further legislative goals by filling the
interstitial silences within a state . . . . Because legislators cannot foresee all even-
tualities, judges must decide unanticipated cases by extrapolating from related
statutes . . . . But legislative silence is not always the result of a lack of prescience;
it may instead betoken permission or, perhaps, considered abstention from regu-
lation. In that event, judges are not accredit to supercede Congress . . . by embel-
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It is interesting to note that this creativity did not go unnoticed by the
Seventh Circuit. The Seventh Circuit's broad based recognition of a right to
recovery for loss of life in Bass and Sherrod is subject to question because
it is premised on the holding in Bell, which in turn rests on Guyton. In Bell,
the Seventh Circuit was compelled to provide an avenue of redress for a
murder by a police officer; a murder subsequently covered up for two decades
by the police officers. In framing a remedy, the court found itself constrained
by a Wisconsin survival and wrongful death statutory scheme that set a
maximum recovery of $25,000 payable to a strict hierarchy of beneficiaries. 25
Finding Guyton the only case "directly pertinent," the court concluded that
unless the decedent's estate was compensated for the decedent's loss of life,
the deterrence objective of section 1983 would be subverted.' 26
Curiously, the court also found it compelling that Wisconsin law precluded
an award of punitive damages. 27 Prior to Bell, the Supreme Court in Smith
v. Wade, 28 had ruled that punitive damages were available as a matter of
federal common law under appropriate circumstances in a section 1983
action, 29 and such damages were certainly appropriate under the facts of
Bell. Accordingly, whether the Wisconsin state statute allowed for an award
of punitive damages was an irrelevant consideration.
In Bass, the Seventh Circuit, citing only Bell and Guyton, refused to
borrow the survival and wrongful death statute of Illinois. 30 Unlike the
California survival statute modified in Guyton, the Illinois survival statute
allowed recovery for pain and suffering. Also, contrary to the Wisconsin
wrongful death statute rejected in Bell, the Illinois wrongful death statute
placed no dollar limitation on the amount of recovery. Yet, the court cited
to these cases to support its holding that "state law that precludes recovery
on behalf of the victim's estate for the loss of life is inconsistent with the
deterrent policy of section 1983."3' This inconsistency presumably stemmed
from the failure of the state law to reflect the Guyton rule recognizing
recovery for loss of life. In addition, the court found it compelling that
Illinois courts had interpreted the Illinois statutes as precluding recovery for
lishing upon the regulatory scheme. Accordingly, caution must temper judicial
creativity in the face of legislative . .. silence.
Id. at 565.
See also Traynor, Limits of Judicial Creativity, 29 HASTiNGs L.J. 1025 (1978) (judge must
set limits on judicial creativity sufficient to preserve distance between judicial analysis and
legislative innovation).
125. 746 F.2d 1205, 1250 (7th Cir. 1984).
126. Id. at 1239.
127. Id. at 1240-41.
128. 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
129. Id. It is conceivable that there could be a finding of liabiity against an officer under
the fourteenth amendment for an unconstitutional killing, where the standard is malice and
where an award of punitive damages would be inappropriate.
130. 769 F.2d 1173, 1190 (7th. Cir 1985).
131. Id.
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punitive damages,' again failing to recognize that such a right existed as a
matter of federal common law under section 1983 so that the state interpre-
tation was irrelevant.
Finally, in a single paragraph, the Seventh Circuit in Sherrod allowed a
claim for loss of life in a police shooting case solely on the basis of Bell
and Bass.'33 Sherrod is revolutionary, however, because the Seventh Circuit
refused to reverse the district court's decision to allow an expert to give
testimony defining the "hedonic value" of life, a claim for which the jury
awarded $850,000 in damages to the decedent's estate. 134
But without Guyton as precedent, Bell, Bass, and Sherrod cannot stand
as viable authority. In Guyton, the court found that traditional tort damages
provided an inadequate remedy for a claim where the constitutional depri-
vation resulted in death.' Purporting to rely on Carey v. Piphus,136 it
132. Id.
133. 827 F.2d 195, 207 (7th Cir. 1987).
134. Id. at 205-06. The district court had relied in part on an English model that allowed
for recovery of damages for the "loss of expectation of life." Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp.
159, 164 (N.D. Il1. 1985), aff'd, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987). But it failed to note that the
English had statutorily abolished such damages in 1982. See Administration of Justice Act, §
1 (1) (a) (1982); White, Damages for the Lost Earnings of the Lost Years, 20 IR. JUR. 295,
314 & nn. 45 & 46 (1985).
In any event, the English allowed for recovery of general damages. See McCann v. Sheppard,
1 W.L.R. 540, 553 (C.A. 1973). General damages, however, are not recoverable under section
1983. Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986); Taliferro v.
Augle, 757 F.2d 157, 162 (7th Cir. 1985). Moreover, the English system was not one that placed
unbridled discretion in the hands of a jury. In the lead case on the subject, the House of Lords
had explained that:
It would be fallacious to assume, for this purpose, that all human life is continuously
an enjoyable thing, so that the shortening of it calls for compensation, to be paid
to the deceased's estate, on a quantitative basis. The ups and downs of life, its
pains and sorrows as well as its joys and pleasures-all that makes up 'life's fitful
fever'-have to be allowed for in the estimate. In assessing damages for shortening
of life, therefore, such damages should not be calculated solely, or even mainly,
on the basis of the length of life that is lost.
The truth, of course, is that in putting a money value on the prospective balance
of happiness in years that the deceased might otherwise have lived, the jury or
judge of fact is attempting to equate incommensurables. Damages which would be
proper for a disabling injury may well be much greater than for deprivation of life.
These considerations lead me to the conclusion that in assessing damages under this
head, whether in the case of a child or an adult, very moderate figures should be
chosen.
Benham v. Gambling, 57 T.L.R. 177, 180-81 (H.L. 1940).
See also O'Leary v. United States Lines Co., 111 F. Supp. 745, 747 (D. Mass. 1953) (rejecting
damages for loss of life under Massachusetts law and discussing difficulties encountered by the
English); Developments in the Law: Damages-1935-194 7, 61 HARV. L. REv. 113, 143-44 (1947)
(few American courts to consider loss of enjoyment have refused it, as well as recovery for
loss of life expectancy).
135. 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1167-68 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
136. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
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determined that presumed constitutional damages were in order because of
the importance of the constitutional right violated. 3 7 Because the California
district court perceived that presumed constitutional damages flowed from
the violation of that constitutional right, it created an independent consti-
tutional claim for the loss of the right to life.'38 This major premise of the
Guyton decision, so important to the holding in Bell, which in turn was
essential to Bass and Sherrod, has apparently been rejected by the Supreme
Court in Stachura. 3 9 Moreover, under Stachura, it would appear that state
death remedies that have evolved to compensate for death would be perfectly
appropriate for adoption under section 1988.
From a practical standpoint, recognition of the right to recover for loss
of life presents a significant problem in placing a value on the loss of life.
Because life has been described as "the primordial experience of being alive,
of experiencing the elemental sensation of vitality and of fearing its extinc-
tion, - ' 40 placing a value on it poses a vexing problem for juries and jurists
alike.' 4' Both are confronted with the awesome task of determining what a
decedent's life would have been worth to him had he lived, which entails
placing a value on intangibles that would only have had value to the decedent
had he lived long enough to enjoy them. 42
IV. RECOVERY FOR AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL KILLING: DEVELOPING A
WORKABLE STANDARD
A. Standing
It is relatively clear that the representative of the decedent's estate is the
only person with standing to sue for civil redress in an unconstitutional
killing case. 43 The closely related but distinct issue of whether the decedent's
137. 532 F. Supp. at 1167-68. As the Supreme Court recently explained, however, "[p]resumed
damages are a substitute for ordinary compensatory damages, not a supplement for an award
that fully compensates the alleged injury." Stachura, 477 U.S. at 310 (emphasis in original).
138. 532 F. Supp. at 1168.
139. 477 U.S. at 310.
140. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 938 & n.1 (lst ed. 1978) (quoting Edward
Shils).
141. For example, in Guyton, the district court awarded $100,000 damages more by presti-
digitation than any articulable basis. The court awarded $5,000 for "the outrage of an arrest;"
$750 for "humiliation, embarrassment, and discomfort;" $10,000 to a husband and $2,500 to
his wife for "humiliation and mental distress for unlawful arrest, search, incarceration, and
prosecution;" $5,000 "to a person deprived of his liberty by an unlawful arrest;" and $3,000
"for a deprivation of a prisoner's first amendment rights to practice his religion." 532 F. Supp.
at 1168. (citation omitted). From these figures, the district court determined that a claim for
the loss of the right to life was worth $100,000. Id.
Likewise, in Sherrod, a jury awarded $850,000 in damages for the "hedonic value" of life,
guided only by its perceptions of that amorphous concept. 629 F. Supp. at 160.
142. Cf. Stachura, 477 U.S. at 310 (because jurists have little guidance, they are "free to
award arbitrary amounts without any evidentiary basis, or to use their unbounded discretion
to punish unpopular defendants"). See also Taliferro v. Augle, 757 F.2d 157, 162 (7th Cir.
1985) (court limited plaintiff's damages because he made no effort to establish objective basis
for quantifying his loss).
143. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. These persons lack standing to seek damages
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survivors have an independent associational interest in the continued life of
the decedent is a question the Supreme Court has yet to address.144
in their own right for the injuries suffered by the decedent. First person standing is vested in
the personal representative of the decedent, who merely stands in the shoes of the decedent in
order to vindicate the decedent's rights offended prior to his death, a case or controversy under
Article III. That Congress has through section 1988 provided for the adoption of state law in
absence of federal law-here, to provide a remedy for the decedent's action for death-that as
an incident of adoption confers a benefit to the third party survivors, does not alter standing
rules under section 1983: the decedent's estate has the standing, it is only the adoption of the
state law at the remedy phase of the analysis that confers the benefit to third party survivors.
Conferring such a benefit to a decedent's survivors can only be accomplished through the
license granted by section 1988 to adopt analogous state law. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.
228, 241 (1979) ("Statutory rights and obligations are established by Congress, and it is entirely
appropriate for Congress, in creating these rights and obligations, to determine in addition who
may enforce them and in what manner."). Cf. S. v. D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973) (violation
of statutorily created right confers standing even though right does not exist apart from statute).
Without invoking section 1988, these persons would lack standing to receive damages for the
death of the decedent, except that the death deprived them of their own independent liberty
interest. See supra note 13.
Professor Steinglass argued that section 1983 analysis mandates the creation of a federal
common law of wrongful death. See supra note 6, at 644-61. But, this argument is subject to
challenge in several respects. First, section 1988 is an enactment of Congress that should not
be lightly cast aside. See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978)(Congress's role is to
formulate legislative policy). Second, the Supreme Court's decision in Carlson v. Green, 446
U.S. 14 (1980), is weak precedential support for creation of a federal common law of wrongful
death because the defendants were members of the FBI who were sued directly under the
Constitution in a Bivens action. As noted in Carlson, section 1988 does not apply to such
actions. Id. at 24 n.11. Because there were no concerns of federalism, the Supreme Court was
free to create a federal common law rule of survivorship without reference to state law.
144. See Jones v. Hildebrant, 432 U.S. 183 (1977) (dismissing certiorari as improvidently
granted). In Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1242-48 (7th Cir. 1984), the Seventh
Circuit recognized a parent's liberty interest under the fourteenth amendment in the continued
life of a child, while refusing to find such an interest between siblings. This holding was based
in part on two opinions written by Judge Kane. See Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F.
Supp. 282 (D. Colo 1982); Sanchez v. Marquez, 457 F. Supp. 359 (D. Colo. 1978). But see
Jackson v. Marsh, 551 F. Supp. 1091, 1094 (D. Colo. 1982) ("The Supreme Court has never
addressed, nor has it created, a right of a constitutional magnitude which protects individuals
from particular acts of governmental agents focusing upon specific family members and
potentially affecting the continuity of the intrafamily relationship."). Judge Kane, however,
had in the meantime reconsidered his prior opinions in light of Jackson and adopted its holding
in White v. Talboys, 573 F. Supp. 49, 51 (D. Colo. 1983), a fact overlooked by the Seventh
Circuit in Bell.
The Tenth Circuit, however, more recently expanded on Bell to allow recovery to siblings as
well as parents in a section 1983 death case. Trujillo v. Board of County Comm'rs, 768 F.2d
1186 (10th Cir. 1985). The court, however, added a state of mind requirement by requiring
"an allegation of intent to interfere with a particular relationship protected by the freedom of
intimate association" in order to state a claim under section 1983. Id. at 1190. See also Kelson
v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 653 (9th Cir. 1985) (state's interference with parents'
constitutionally protected liberty interest in companionship of their children is cognizable under
section 1983); Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588, 593-95 (8th Cir. 1976) (father of minor whom
police shot and killed had standing to bring action challenging statutes authorizing such action),
cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977); Myres v. Rask, 602 F. Supp. 210, 213 & n.4 (D. Colo. 1985)
(parents could maintain civil rights action for violation of their constitutional right to family
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B. Survival Of The Claim
As Robertson makes clear, whether a decedent's claim survives is resolved
by reference to state law. 45 In a situation where a state law would preclude
the survival of a section 1983 claim where unconstitutional conduct was the
cause of death, the analysis of Jaco v. Bloechle 46 is compelling. In Jaco,
the Second Circuit was confronted with a state survival statute that caused
an action to abate where death was instantaneous. As the court explained,
it was obligated to "gauge the impact of abatement upon the 'goal of
compensating those injured,' and [section] 1983's role in preventing official
illegality. 147 The court held that where the unconstitutional conduct caused
death, the remedial purpose of section 1983 would be defeated if the action
was to abate as state law required.1 48 The state rule was thus rejected and
the claim allowed to survive as a matter of federal common law.149
C. Fourth Amendment Standard
Recovery for an unconstitutional killing by a police officer committed in
the course of arrest should be governed solely by a fourth amendment
standard. 150 As Judge Easterbrook has explained, the objective standards of
the fourth amendment are well defined and turn on the objective reasona-
association). Cf. Estate of Bailey by Oare v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 509 n.7 (3d Cir.
1985) (court found no duty owed to plaintiff but conceded that plaintiff's father had a liberty
interest in preserving her life and safety from state action); de la Cruz v. Chevere Ortiz, 637
F. Supp. 43, 45-46 (D. P.R. 1986) (adopting Bell analysis over that of Trujillo). But cf.
Valdivieso Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1986) (stepfather and siblings have no liberty
interest in continued life of an adult relative); Trejo v. Wattles, 636 F. Supp. 992, 996 (D.
Colo. 1985) (finding plaintiff stated claim for a violation of "his parental right to have his son
freely associate").
145. 436 U.S. 584, 590 (1978).
146. 739 F.2d 239 (6th Cir. 1984).
147. Id. at 244 (citing Robertson, 436 U.S. at 592). Similarly, the Fifth Circuit passionately
summed up the policy considerations in Brasier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 921 (1961):
[lit defies history to conclude that Congress purposely meant to assure to the living
freedom from such unconstitutional deprivations, but that, with life precision, it
meant to withdraw the protection of civil rights statutes against the peril of death.
The policy of the law and the legislative aim was certainly to protect the security
of life and limb as well as property against these actions. Violent injury that would
kill was not less prohibited than violence which would cripple.
293 F.2d at 404.
Cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (Bivens action survives where state law would
cause action to abate).
148. 739 F.2d at 244-45.
149. Id. at 245.
150. See Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1987). See also Comment,
Excessive Force Claims: Removing the Double Standard, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1369 (1986)
(advocating fourth amendment standard for use of force during arrest). The analysis is less
clear where the unconstitutional conduct occurs outside the context of arrest. See Lester, 830
F.2d at 713 n.7.
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bleness of a police officer's use of force rather than the completely subjective
interpretation of what is shocking to the conscience of a particular district
court.15' Ironically, it is the Seventh Circuit that has taken the lead in
repudiating the application of the doctrine of substantive due process in
arrest cases. In Lester v. City of Chicago, 152 the Seventh Circuit overruled
the majority opinion in Gumz v. Morrissette,1" which had adopted the Glick
fourteenth amendment excessive force standard, and held that police excessive
force cases should be analyzed solely under a fourth amendment objective
reasonableness standard. 15 4
In reversing Gumz, Judge Manion relied on a perceived shift by the
Supreme Court away from the shocking to the conscience substantive due
process analysis to a fourth amendment objective reasonableness standard.'
Under the fourth amendment, the subjective intent of the police officer is
irrelevant. "An objectively, unreasonable seizure violates the Constitution
regardless of an officer's good intent; likewise, an objectively reasonable
seizure does not violate the Constitution despite the officer's bad intent." 156
D. Adopting State Law To Shape A Remedy
In order to provide a workable remedy for death under section 1983, it is
necessary to retrace some analytical steps and put all the pieces of the puzzle
together. Initially, it is essential to bear in mind the basic differences between
survival and wrongful death actions. Survival claims allow a decedent's
personal claim, which existed prior to death, to continue. Wrongful death
actions are designed to compensate the estate for the economic harm to it
as well as to benefit survivors. The section 1983 action for death survives
the decedent's death where an unconstitutional act caused the death. If the
unconstitutional act occurred during the course of an arrest, the claim that
survives is one for an unreasonable seizure under the fourth amendment,
brought by the representative of the decedent's estate. Thus, the claim
confronting the district court is a claim for an unreasonable seizure under
the fourth amendment where the injury caused by the seizure is death.
Section 1983 is silent as to the appropriate remedy where the injury is
death. Fortunately, section 1988 counsels the district court to search for an
analogous state remedy. The states have traditionally relied on wrongful
death statutes, contravening the common law rule against recovery for death.
Because wrongful death statutes are the analogous state remedy for death,
they should be adopted in order to provide a damage template for the injury
151. Gumz v. Morrissette,,772 F.2d 1395, 1406-07 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J., concur-
ring).
152. 830 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1987).
153. 772 F.2d 1395 (7th Cir. 1985).
154. 830 F.2d at 713.
155. Id. at 711-13.
156. Id. at 712.
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of death. To the extent that the section 1983 action seeks redress for conscious
pain and suffering prior to death, survival statutes provide the remedial
analog for that injury. Hybrid survival statutes are particularly suited for
adoption where a case involves both conscious pain and suffering and death.
In states where the survival and wrongful death actions are separate, adopting
the survival action for conscious pain and suffering and the wrongful death
action as the remedial analog for death has the effect of combining the two
actions into one, both for the benefit of the decedent's estate, in effect
converting the civil rights death action into a hybrid survival action.
This flexible system should yield a result consistent with the objectives of
section 1983 as well as provide some consistency and predictability. State
wrongful death remedies, which have evolved over the last century, provide
an excellent outline for the federal remedy. Because the law of torts has
been accurately described as "a battle ground of social theory,"' 57 adopting
the state statutory analogies for recovery for death in a section 1983 claim
ensures some predictability in the result, as well as affords federal courts
the benefit of the experience of state courts which are presented with death
cases much more frequently. For this reason, section 1988 has the desired
effect of incorporating state statutes reflecting the prevalent social policies
on recovery for death. The economic valuation techniques utilized by most
states would now seem perfectly appropriate in a section 1983 case since the
"abstract value" of the constitutional right itself is no longer an appropriate
factor for awarding damages.
Although the remedies for death are almost as numerous as there are
states, section 1988 provides the resiliency to adapt to each. The borrowed
state law need not fit perfectly with federal objectives, but need only provide
a workable analogy. If, however, a particular state lags behind its sister
states in evolving its doctrine, a strong case can be made for finding its law
inconsistent with federal policies. When confronted with inconsistent state
law, a district court should exercise its "federal veto,"' s but should not be
entitled to exercise unbridled discretion in creating federal law. 5 9 The law
of other states should be consulted and the best rule, or a collage of the
better aspects of the rule of several states, borrowed to fill the void between
the inconsistent state statute and a result consistent with section 1983.
157. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 38, at 15.
158. Kreimer, supra note 18, at 621.
159. See Kreimer, supra note 18, at 630-32. In Professor Kreimer's view, section 1988 was
never meant to mandate rigid adherence to a vast and divergent body of state law, and the
resultant necessity for federal courts to excavate an "arcana of nineteenth century tort doctrine."
He suggests that the courts establish a common law of civil rights law by "search[ing] for the
best current common law rule in light of federal policies." He does not advocate, however,
that the courts run unbridled through the still infant frontiers of federal civil rights law, but
instead offers pragmatically, and in deferrence to the principle of stare decisis, that the federal
courts cannot ignore state law that serves the purposes of federal law. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The loss of life claim under section 1983 has arisen not by accretion, but
as the byproduct of unrestrained judicial activism. Its objective of compen-
sating a dead person for losing his right to life is quixotic and has no prior
basis in American law. By lending further plausibility to this approach, the
Seventh Circuit trivialized both the role of section 1988 as a choice of law
provision in civil rights actions and the -role of the states in determining
social policy in death cases. If state death statutes serve the policies of section
1983, they should not be lightly discarded in favor of the unrestrained
expansion of federal common law.
The unconstitutional taking of life certainly merits redress in the courts.
But in so doing, the district courts must remain mindful of presently artic-
ulated constitutional analysis under section 1983. Those courts that have
rejected adopting state death remedies have been quick to cast section 1988
as a villain. Such a characterization is unfortunate, however, because it
misses the true benefit of the statute. Because state law adopted under section
1988 need only be analogous, section 1988 allows for an imperfect fit between
the state provision selected and the desired federal objective. Section 1988
thus provides the flexibility to confer benefits by adopting state wrongful
death remedies for third persons who otherwise would lack standing to
recover damages.
When coupled with the availability of punitive damages as a matter of
federal common law under section 1983, the adoption of state death remedies
adequately serves the compensation and deterrence objectives of section 1983.
Section 1983 requires no more. To cast aside this workable system in order
to accomplish the unrealistic objective of paying money to someone who is
already dead would be both unfortunate and unnecessary under presently
articulated constitutional standards.
VI. ADDENDUM
As this Article was being finalized for publication, Sherrod v. Berry,160 on
petition for rehearing en banc before the Seventh Circuit, was vacated,16'
and, after rehearing, reversed and remanded for retrial on other grounds. 62
The court held that the introduction of evidence demonstrating the decedent
to be unarmed in fact at the time he was shot by the police was not only
irrelevant to the question of whether the police could have reasonably believed
the decedent to be armed, but also so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. 63
The Seventh Circuit did not reach the loss of life claim or the viability of
"hedonic damages," but directed the district court to resolve such issues in
160. Supra note 2.
161. 835 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
162. No. 85-3151, slip op. (7th Cir. August 22, 1988) (en banc).
163. Id. at 4-11.
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light of its earlier, vacated opinion, which allowed such claims to stand.'6
In any event, the loss of life claim is still very much alive in the Seventh
Circuit, and that Court will assuredly confront the issue of "hedonic dam-
ages" in the near future.
164. Id. at 11.
